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DISPARATE DRESS CODES AS SEX DISCRIMINATION IN
VIOLATION OF TITLE VII
Carroll v. Talman FederalSavings & Loan Association
604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1316 (1980)
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act' prohibits employers from
engaging in practices which discriminate upon the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.2 The purpose of this comprehensive
legislation is to create equal opportunities, conditions, privileges, and
compensation in employment 3 for the traditional victims of job discrimination-blacks, other racial minorities, and women. 4 Particularly
with respect to sex discrimination, the courts are continually faced with
the question of what kinds of employment practices are unlawful under
title VII. Not only is title VII silent as to the definition of "discrimination," but the legislative history also sheds little light on Congress' intcntion in adding sex as a basis of discrimination under title VII.5 As a
result, the courts have been left with the problem of interpreting the
statute without the aid of any clear legislative guidelines. 6 It is therefore not surprising that judicial interpretations of what constitutes unlawful sex discrimination under title VII often conflict.
Employer-promulgated grooming and dress code policies are one
type of employment practice which have been challenged as unlawful
sex discrimination under title VII. Generally, the federal courts which
i. Hereinafter referred to in text and footnotes as title VII.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1978).
3. Sections 703(a)(1) and 703(a)(2) provide:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1978).
4. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. I, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2401. For a general discussion of the purpose of title VII, see generally Note, Developments
in the Law--Employment Discriminationand Title II ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 1109 (1971).
5. For a discussion of the legislative history surrounding the enactment of title VII with
respect to sex discrimination, see text accompanying notes 14-20 infra.
6. For a discussion of judicial interpretations of what constitutes unlawful sex discrimination under title VII, see text accompanying notes 21-63 infra.
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have decided the validity of grooming regulations involving different
requirements based upon sex have upheld them as permissible employment practices. 7 However, in Carroll v. Talman FederalSavings & Loan
Association,8 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court 9 and held that an employer's dress code
requiring its female employees to wear a uniform as a condition of
employment, while only requiring male employees in the same job position to wear "appropriate business attire" constituted sex discrimination under section 703(a)(1) of title VII.1° In contrast, the dissenting
opinion concluded that dress code regulations were not the kind of employment practices which Congress intended to prohibit under title
VII. I I
In light of the differing conclusions among the federal courts upon
the question of whether grooming and dress code standards are subject
to title VII scrutiny, analysis of the Carrollopinion is warranted. This
comment will outline briefly the legislative history and judicial interpretations of title VII with respect to sex discrimination, present the
responses of other circuits to challenges of grooming and dress codes,
and finally analyze the Carrollopinion. It will be shown that the Seventh Circuit correctly ruled that a dress code which imposes disparate
conditions of employment by sex is a primafacie case of sex discrimination under section 703(a)(1) of title VII.12 The comment concludes
that the majority opinion in Carroll signifies a wise departure from
other circuits' interpretations of title VII with respect to sex-based regulations. 13
DEFINING SEX DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE

VII

Despite the voluminous legislative history surrounding the enact7.
8.
9.
10.
It

See text accompanying notes 65-88 infra.
604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1316 (1980).
Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 448 F. Supp. 79 (N.D. I11.1978).
Section 703(a)(1) provides:
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(I) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin . ...

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1978).
11. For a discussion of Judge Pell's dissent, see text accompanying notes 113-21 and 126-31
ifa.

12. Compare the language of section 703(a)(1) with the language of section 703(a)(2). See
note 3 supra.
13. See text accompanying notes 122-28 infra.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

ment of title VII, 14 little of it reflects the intent of Congress in adding
the word "sex" to race, color, religion, and national origin. As originally drafted, title VII contained no ban of sex discrimination.I5 However, just one day prior to its passage, a floor amendment effected the
inclusion of sex as part of title VII. 16 Even at the time, there was some
question as to what the sponsor of the amendment intended by its in17
troduction.
Although the ban of discrimination based upon sex was enacted
into law with a minimum of investigation and debate,' 8 the legislative
history of the 1972 amendments to title VII1 9 indicates that discrimination against women is "no less serious than other forms of prohibited
employment practices and is to be accorded the same degree of social
concern given to any type of unlawful discrimination. '20 Nevertheless,
the courts have encountered particular problems in the interpretation
of gender-based discrimination under title VII. Therefore, a discussion
of judicial decisions defining sex discrimination within the meaning of
title VII is helpful.

14. The debates that preceded the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Bill in the Senate alone
lasted for eighty-three days. 110 CONG. REC. 2882-14,511 (1964).
15. For a detailed background on title VII prior to the addition of "sex" as a provision, see
Miller, Sex Discriminationand Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L. REV. 877
(1967).
16. See 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964).
17. The amendment was introduced by Congressman Smith of Virginia, who voted against
title VII, and whose strategy was allegedly to "clutter up" title VII so that it would not be passed
at all. See 110 CONG. REC. 2581 (1964) (remarks of Congresswoman Green).
18. Because of the meager legislative history, some courts have held that Congress intended
to limit sex discrimination only to those employment practices which prevent equal employment
opportunities. See, e.g., Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
For further analysis of Fagan, see text accompanying notes 67-69 infra.
In contrast, some courts have relied upon an interpretative memorandum submitted by title
VII's floor managers which defined "'to discriminate' as to make a distinction, to make a differ...110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964). See, e.g., Sprogis v. United Air
ence in treatment or favor.
Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
19. H.R. REP. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 4-5, reprintedin [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2137, 2140-41.
20. H.R. REP. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprintedin [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS

2137, 2141. The major purpose of the 1972 amendments was to remedy the failure to include
effective enforcement powers in title VII by granting the Equal Enforcement Opportunity Commission (EEOC) broader authority. H.R. REP. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 9, reprintedin [1972]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2137, 2137-45. Thus, Congress enacted a new section 706 of title

VII which empowered the EEOC, after it exhausted the procedures for achieving voluntary compliance, to issue complaints and hold hearings, to issue cease and desist orders against discriminatory practices, and to seek enforcement of its orders in the federal district courts. The EEOC,
upon a finding of reasonable cause, will issue a right to sue letter which allows the plaintiff to
bring suit in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1978).

1252
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EstablishingSex Discrimination Under Section 703 of Title VII
Generally, the courts engage in a two-step analysis in determining
whether an employment practice is unlawful under title VII. First, a
court must determine that discrimination based upon sex in fact occurred. 2' In considering this first step, the United States Supreme
Court has indicated that title VII is to be liberally construed.2 2 In Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 23 the Supreme Court gave a very broad
definition of sex discrimination under section 703 of title VII. At issue
in Phillps was whether the employer's policy of hiring men with preschool children, but not women with pre-school children, was a prima
facie case of sex discrimination. 24 In reversing the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,25 the Court held that such an employment practice constituted sex discrimination under title VII.26 Recognizing that title VII requires that persons of like qualifications be given
employment opportunities irrespective of their sex, the Court reasoned
that, although the company did not discriminate against all women, it
singled out women with pre-school children for disfavored treatment
which they would not have received but for the fact that they were
female.2 7 Thus, the Phillps decision held that aprimafaciecase of sex
are
discrimination exists whenever similarly-situated individuals
28
sex.
of
basis
the
upon
solely
manner
disparate
a
treated in
21. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Courts look to the'language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), supra note 3, in determining whether discrimination occurred.
22. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), where the Supreme Court held
that "employment practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face," and in the absence of any
discriminatory purpose, "cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior
[discriminatory] practices." Id. at 430. Unlike plaintiffs in constitutional cases who must show
proof of a discriminatory purpose or intent on the part of defendant to establish a primafaciecase
under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, plaintiffs in title VII cases need to
show only proof of a discriminatory impact to establish a prima/aciecase. Compare Griggs (title
VII standards) with Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247 (1976) (equal protection standards
under the fourteenth amendment).
23. 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam). Phillipswas the first case of title VII sex discrimination
decided by the United States Supreme Court. No subsequent court decisions have deviated from
this original holding.
24. Id.
25. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1969).
26. 400 U.S. at 544.
27. Id.
28. Id. The Supreme Court thus rejected the narrower "sex-plus" theory espoused by the
Fifth Circuit in the case below. The Fifth Circuit had reasoned:
The discrimination was based on a two-pronged qualification, i.e., a woman with preschool age children. Ida Phillips was not refused employment because she was a woman
nor because she had pre-school age children. It is the coalescence of these two elements
that denied her the position she desired. . . . A per se violation of the Act can only be
discrimination based solely on one of the categories, i.e., in the case of sex; women vis-avis men. When another criterion of employment is added to one of the classifications
listed in the Act, there is no longer apparent discrimination based solely on . . .sex.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit expanded the definition of sex discrimination in the leading case of
Sprogis v. UnitedAir Lines, Inc. 29 In Sprogis, the plaintiff brought suit
alleging that United Air Lines' policy of requiring its stewardesses to be
unmarried as a condition of employment, where no such policy existed
for its stewards, was in violation of section 703(a)(1) of title VII.30 In
invalidating United Air Lines' "no-marriage" rule, the court not only
held that section 703(a)(1) is violated when a portion of a protected
class is discriminated against solely upon the basis of sex, 3 1 but also
that disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes was prohibited under title VII.32 In short, Phillps and Sprogis at
a minimum stand for the general proposition that a primafade case of
sex discrimination is established whenever any term or condition of
employment treats female and male employees in a disparate manner
solely upon the basis of sex, or if the basis for the disparate term or
conditions results from sex stereotypes.
Courts which have strictly followed the principles laid down by
the Phillips and Sprogis decisions have found any term or condition of
employment which on its face treated men and women in a disparate
manner, but which did not necessarily hinder or prevent one sex from
obtaining employment, to be unlawful under title VII. 33 For example,
411 F.2d 1, 3-4 (5th Cir. 1969).
29. 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971). Every United States court of
appeals as well as the United States Supreme Court has relied upon the Sprogis decision. See,
e.g., City of Los Angeles Dept. Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978), where the
Court stated: "It is now well recognized that employment decisions cannot be predicated on mere
,stereotyped' impressions about the characteristics of males or females."
30. 444 F.2d at 1196-97.
31. Thus, the Sprogis court applied the Phillips definition to an action brought under section
703(a)(1) of title VII. The Phillps case was brought under section 703(a)(2) which prohibits employers from depriving individuals of employment opportunities. See note 3 supra.
32. The Seventh Circuit held:
The scope of Section 703(a)(1) is not confined to explicit discriminations based "solely"
on sex. In forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex,
Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women resulting from sex stereotypes. Section 703(a)(1) subjects to scrutiny and eliminates such irrational impediments to job opportunities and enjoyment which have
plagued women in the past.
444 F.2d at 1198.
33. See, e.g., Pond v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 500 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1974) (women were subject
to more restrictive height and weight restrictions than male employees); Williams v. General
Foods Corp., 492 F.2d 399 (7th Cir. 1974) (female employees were not allowed to work overtime);
Hays v. Potlatch Forest, 465 F.2d 1081 (8th Cir. 1972) (women were restricted to a certain number
of regular and overtime hours without similar restrictions on males); Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1972) (female employees were not allowed to work same
number of hours per day as male employees); Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 359 F. Supp.
1002 (W.D. Pa. 1973) .(women were paid lower salaries than men who performed identical work
under similar conditions).
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in Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,34 a federal district court held that a
rule which forbade all female flight attendants from wearing eyeglasses, but which allowed male employees to wear them, was a violation of title VII. 35 Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit has held that a company policy compelling a married woman to use her husband's name constituted unlawful sex discrimina36
tion.
Rebutting a Prima Facie Case of Sex Discrimination
If the court concludes that an employee has established a prima
facie case of sex discrimination, then the employer has the burden of
proof to show that sex is a bona fide occupational qualification 37 reasonably necessary to the operation of the employer's business in order
to justify the discrimination under title VII.38 In lieu of the statutory
BFOQ, employers have also raised the judicially-created "business necessity" defense to rebut a primafaciecase of sex discrimination under
39
title VII.
Both the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 4° guidelines on sex discrimination 4 ' and the courts narrowly construe the
34. 366 F. Supp. 763 (D.D.C. 1973), vacated and remanded in part and a17'd inpart,567 F.2d
429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
35. The decision was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit even though the specific issue of sex-based eyeglass restrictions was not appealed.
See 567 F.2d at 439 n.24, 454 n. 170. The court also held six other conditions of employment to be
a violation of title VII: (1) female flight attendants were required to carry specific luggage while
males were only required to have luggage in good condition; (2) male flight attendants were given
a $52 clothing allowance per year, while female flight attendants were not given a similar allowance; (3) the maximum height for males was 6', while maximum height for females was 5'9"; (4)
females were not allowed to fly after they turned thirty-two years of age, while men were not so
restricted; (5) females had to share hotel rooms, while males had private hotel rooms; and (6)
females were weighed twice a year and were grounded if overweight, while males were merely
subject to weight monitoring. Id. at 454-57.
36. Allen v. Lovejoy, 553 F.2d 522 (6th Cir. 1977).
37. Hereinafter referred to in text and footnotes as BFOQ.
38. Section 703(e) of title VII provides in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for any employer to hire employees ... on the basis of his religion,
sex, or national origin or in the instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona
fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976). See generally Sirota, Sex Discrimination.- Title VII and the Bona
Fide OccupationalQualication,55 TEX. L. REV. 1025 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Sirotal.
39. For a discussion of the business necessity defense, see text accompanying notes 56-63
infra.

40. Hereinafter referred to in text and footnotes as EEOC.
41. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.1-.10 (1979). The United States Supreme Court has stated that the
guidelines are to be accorded great deference by the courts. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 434 (1971).
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BFOQ defense. 4 2 For example, the EEOC guidelines do not consider
sex a BFOQ when the discrimination is based upon sexual stereotypes. 4 3 Nor do the guidelines consider sex a BFOQ based upon preferences of co-workers, employers, clients, or customers. 44 However,
where it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity, such as requiring
an actor to portray a man or an actress to portray a woman, sex will be
45
considered a BFOQ under the guidelines.
Mindful of the EEOC guidelines, the courts also have narrowly
interpreted this statutory defense, although no uniform test has been
adopted by federal appellate courts in determining whether an employer has established a BFOQ defense. For example, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in rejecting an employer's
defense that being female was a BFOQ for a job as a flight attendant,
held that a BFOQ will be sustained only where being a particular sex
goes to the "essence" of performing a particular job. 46 The Fifth Circuit, however, adopted a different standard in Weeks v. Southern Bell
Telephone & Telegraph Co.47 by concluding that an employer must
prove that a factual basis existed for having reasonable cause to believe
that all or substantially all women would be unable to perform the job
safely and effectively. 4 8 The strictest test was adopted by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Rosenfeld v. Southern
Pacific Co. 49 where the court held that an evaluation of each individual's ability to perform must be considered in determining whether sexual characteristics are crucial to performing the work. 50 In short,
regardless of which test is applied, the courts and the EEOC have suggested that sex may be a valid BFOQ in a few specialized instances
such as jobs involving authenticity, 5 1 privacy, 52 sex appeal, 53 psycho42. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1979). See also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977),
where the Court noted that the BFOQ was "in fact meant to be an extremely narrow exception to
the general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex."
43. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(!)(ii) (1979). For example, an employer's policy of refusing to hire
any women for a job which requires the ability to lift 100 pounds is based upon the stereotyped
assumption that all women are physically weaker than men.
44. Id. § 1604.2(a)(l)(iii).
45. Id. § 1604.2(a)(2).
46. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
950 (1971). It appears that there is very little difference between the test applied in Diaz and the
business necessity defense. See text accompanying notes 56-63 infra.
47. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
48. Id. at 235. To determine whether a factual basis existed, the court looked at the individual employee's physical and mental capabilities.
49. 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
50. Id. at 1225-27. See also Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 546 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring).
51. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2) (1979).
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55
logical needs, 54 and prison security.
In lieu of the statutory BFOQ defense, employers also have attempted to raise the judicially-created business necessity defense to rebut a primafade case of sex discrimination. 56 This defense evolved
from cases involving discrimination based upon race 57 in which the
courts recognized that employers may be justified in continuing an employment practice regardless of its differential impact. 58 However, the
test adopted by the courts is a strict one: An employer must show that
the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business 59 and is sufficiently compelling to the business as to override any
disparate impact upon a particular sex. 60 In addition, some courts have
held that an employer must also show that not only does the employment practice effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to
serve, 6 1 but also that there is no other available alternative which
would accomplish the same purpose better or equally well with lesser
disparate impact. 62 As a result of the heavy burden imposed upon the
employer, few courts have found the defense valid to defeat a plaintiff's
primafade case under title VII.63 With this background in mind, a
brief look at how various United States courts of appeals have applied
the law to grooming and dress code regulations challenged as unlawful
sex discrimination is useful before analyzing the Carrollopinion.

52. The EEOC has informally recognized that an employer could restrict jobs to members of
one sex because of community standards such as in the case of a restroom attendant or sales clerk
of lingerie. For a thorough discussion of a valid BFOQ, see Sirota, supra note 38, at 1060-65. See
also Roberts v. Union Co., 487 F.2d 387, 389 (6th Cir. 1973).
53. A job as a Playboy Bunny or as a topless dancer may justify sex appeal as a BFOQ. See
Sirota, supra note 38, at 1066-68.
54. A job as a supervisor at a juvenile home for boys may justify the hiring of men only to
satisfy the need for a male image. Id. at 1068-69.
55. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 336 (1971).
56. The doctrine was first expressed in Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v.
United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
57. Unlike discrimination based upon sex, title VII does not set out a statutory defense upon
which a defendant-employer could rely to justify discrimination based upon race.
58. 416 F.2d 980, 989 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
59. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 797-99 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,404 U.S. 1006
(1970).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. But cf.de Laurier v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 588 F.2d 674, 678-81 (9th Cir. 1978)
(business necessity defense defeated a school teacher's primafaciecase of sex discrimination challenging the district's mandatory pregnancy leave policy). The Ninth Circuit did not require a
showing of any available alternatives.
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Grooming and Dress Code Regulations."
Permissible Gender-BasedEmployment Practices
None of the other circuits have had the occasion to review whether
a dress code policy like the one challenged in Carroll v. Talman Federal
Savings & Loan Association64 is a primafacie violation of title VII.
However, where federal appellate courts have considered the validity
of other types of grooming regulations involving different requirements
based upon sex, the courts generally have upheld them as permissible
employment practices. 65 The most common situation has been where a
male employee has brought suit charging sex discrimination based
upon an employer's regulation requiring men, but not women, to wear
short hair as a condition of employment.
In Fagan v. National Cash Register Co.,66 the first of the so-called
"hair cases" decided by a court of appeals, employer National Cash
Register issued hair grooming regulations in response to customer complaints. These regulations required employees of its technical services
department, none of whom were women, to maintain the length of their
hair above the collar. 67 Plaintiff, who wore his hair below collar length,
refused to conform to the company's regulation and consequently was
suspended from his job. He then brought suit under title VII alleging
that he was the victim of unlawful sex discrimination. In upholding the
validity of defendant's hair regulation, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reasoned that Congress never
intended for title VII to interfere in the promulgation and enforcement
of general regulations which have only a de minimus economic effect
upon the employee. 68 Moreover, the court maintained that employers
should have the right to promulgate grooming standards that merely
64. 448 F. Supp. 79, 81 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
65. Courts which have held to the contrary have strictly applied the Phillips and Sprogis
principles in finding that such disparate treatment was unlawful under title VII. The decisions
generally were premised on the theory that requiring men to wear short hair was the result of sex
stereotyping. See, e.g., Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661 (C.D. Cal. 1972);
Donohue v. Shoe Corp. of America, 337 F. Supp. 1357 (C.D. Cal 1972); Roberts v. General Mills,
Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1057 (N.D. Ohio 1971). See also Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d 400,
402 (6th Cir. 1977) (McCree, J., dissenting); Earwood v. Continental Southeastern Lines, Inc., 539
F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976) (Winter, J., dissenting); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co.,
482 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1973), rev'den banc, 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975).
66. 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
67. Id. at 1116-17. The section of the company's regulations dealing with haircuts provided:
"Hair will be neatly trimmed and combed. The length of the hair will taper down the back of the
head and terminate above the collar. This eliminates any appearance of long hair." Id. at 1116.
68. Id. at 1123, citing Baker v. California Land Title Co., 349 F. Supp. 235, 237-38 (C.D. Cal.
1972). But see Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661 (C.D. Cal. 1972), where the
court found that a dress and grooming code wherein the allowable length of hair was different for
male and female employees could significantly affect employment opportunities:
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reflect the basic differences in the customary dress of men and women
69
without subjecting them to title VII scrutiny.
Five months later, the District of Columbia Circuit again faced a
similar claim of sex discrimination in Dodge v. Giant Food,Inc. 70 In
Dodge, the employer maintained separate grooming standards for men
and women whereby male employees were prohibited from wearing
long hair and beards. 7 1 Female employees, on the other hand, were

allowed to wear their hair in any style as long as it was not "off-beat,"
but were required to wear hairnets if their hair was difficult to manage. 72 The male employees who chose to wear their hair longer than
the required length were discharged or assigned to unfavorable positions. Subsequently, they brought suit challenging the regulations as
unlawful sex discrimination under title VII. 73 Although admitting that
the regulations treating long-haired males differently from long-haired
females were based upon sex, the court held that the regulation was not
unlawful. 74 Following its prior decision in Fagan,the court reiterated
its position that grooming regulations fall outside the scope of title VII
because they do not afford significant employment opportunities to one
sex in favor of the other. 75 In addition, the court interpreted the scope
Title VII . . .is designed to insure equal employment opportunity for all. Specifically, it prohibits discrimination in employment based upon irrational stereotypes of...
sex ....

Males with long hair conjure up exactly the sort of stereotyped responses Congress
intended to be discarded . . .[1long hair may be associated with youth, campus riots,
unemployed hippies and "troublemakers" . . ..Any stereotyped image of males with
longer hair as "troublemakers" unjustFiably punishes a large class ofprospective, otherwise
qualified and competent employees, where an individualized response could adequately
dispose of any real employment conflicts.
Id. at 666 (emphasis added).
69. 481 F.2d at 1124-26. The court in Fagan could have held that there was no sex discrimination simply on the ground that there were no similarly-situated women in plaintiffs position.
However, the court took the opportunity to further justify its decision by weaving together dicta
from prior district and appeals court decisions which would place grooming regulations outside
the scope of title VIL. In so doing, it appears that the District of Columbia Circuit was unwilling
to hold otherwise even if there had been similarly-situated women.
70. 488 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
71. The grooming regulations for male employees provided: "IN]o hair may exist below the
earlobe except for a neatly trimmed mustache which does not droop or hang over the upper lip.
No beards allowed. Haircuts must not be long or ragged. If it is neat, groomed and reasonably
trimmed on the back of the neck, it meets Giant's standards ...." Id. at 1334.
72. The grooming regulations for female employees provides in relevant part: "Whatever the
style, hair should be kept neat. . . .In compliance with hair regulations, meat wrappers, selfservice deli clerks and bakery clerks must wear a hair net if hair is difficult to manage." Id. at
1334.
73. Id. at 1333. The suit was a class action brought on behalf of all males who had been
denied employment, discharged or forced to cut their hair, trim their mustaches, or shave their
beards as a result of defendant's grooming regulations.
74. Id. at 1335.
75. Id. at 1336-37.
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of sex discrimination as being limited to terms and conditions of employment which discriminate upon the basis of an immutable characteristic 76 or involve a fundamental right even though the characteristic
may be readily changeable. 77 Five other federal circuits, 78 not including the Seventh Circuit, have addressed this issue and have followed
the Fagan and Dodge definitions of sex discrimination under title
VII.79

Similarly, in Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 80 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an employer's regulation requiring its male employees who deal with the public to wear ties
does not constitute sex discrimination within the meaning of title VII.81
In Fountain, the plaintiff, a male, was hired at a time when the female
employees were violating the company's dress code by wearing pants
instead of skirts to work.8 2 In response to this action, Safeway
76. Id. Hair length is not an immutable characteristic, but one which can easily be altered.
Accordingly, the court concluded that the sexual distinction embodied in the hair length regulations does not necessarily have to significantly alter employment opportunities and thus is not
protected under title VII. See Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th
Cir. 1975) (en banc), where the court distinguished the readily mutable characteristic of having
long hair from the not so easily mutable condition of having pre-school children in Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam). See note 28 supra.
77. 488 F.2d at 1337. The court attempted to reconcile hair length regulations with the no
marriage rule in Sprogis v. United Airlines, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,404 U.S. 991
(1971). The court agreed that both hair length and marriage were mutable characteristics, but that
marriage had a much more fundamental importance and effect upon an individual's life. Id.
Therefore, in the case of marriage, infringement upon the businessman's right to run his business
was warranted.
78. See Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1977); Earwood v. Continental Southeastern Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1976); Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., 537
F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084
(5th Cir. 1975) (en banc); Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied,422 U.S. 1046 (1975).
79. It appears that the rationale underlying the "hair cases" and their references to dress
standards evidences a more narrow reading of sex discrimination under title VII. But see Phillips
v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam), where the Court did not look to the
importance, significance, mutability, or fundamental nature of the characteristic. Rather, the
Court limited its inquiry to whether there was different treatment of male and female employees.
See also Earwood v. Continental Southeastern Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1976), where
the dissenting judge seized upon the differences between the constitutional test and title VII test
for determining unlawful sex discrimination in attacking the majority's approach:
Grooming standards are clearly "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." Thus
an employer may not vary grooming regulations because of an individual's sex ....
The vice in the majority's approach is that it imports constitutionalnotions of immutability and fundamentality into the process of statutory interpretation. I can find no warrant
for concluding that in enacting Title VII, Congress intended to proscribe only sex discrimination which burdens persons who desire to exercise "fundamental rights" or possess certain "immutable characteristics....
Id. at 1352 (Winter, J., dissenting).
80. 555 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1977).
81. Id. at 756.
82. Id. at 755.
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amended its dress code to accomodate the preferences of the women. 83
Three years later, when the plaintiff was transferred to a clerk's position, the company regulations required him to wear his hair above the
collar and to wear a tie.84 Upon plaintiffs protest, the company acquiesced to his request to wear longer hair, but refused to abolish the tie
requirement.8 5 Refusing to wear a tie, the plaintiff was fired. He then
brought suit claiming that Safeway's enforcement of its grooming regulations was discriminatory because the female employees did not have
to comply with a similar requirement.8 6 In rejecting plaintiffs claim,
the Ninth Circuit reasoned that sex-differentiated dress regulations are
promulgated by employers in an effort to maintain a favorable business
image, and if they are not overly burdensome to employees, they
should be upheld as permissible. 87 However, in Carrollv. Talman FederalSavings & Loan Association,88 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the other federal circuit courts of
appeals in holding that an employer's gender-based dress code was an
impermissible regulation under title VII.
CARROLL V T,4LMAN FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION

Facts of the Case
In 1973, plaintiff Mary Carroll was hired by Talman Federal Savings and Loan Association as a teller. When Carroll was hired, Talman
had a written dress code policy which required its female tellers, officers, and managerial personnel to wear a uniform called a "career
ensemble" as a condition of employment. 89 The uniforms were to be
worn every business day except for the last Tuesday of every month
and two weeks out of the year. 90 However, the dress code policy for
male employees in the same job positions required only that they wear
"proper business attire." 9'
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 756. Plaintiff also alleged that the tie requirement violated the collective bargaining agreement which prohibited termination based upon sex. The court held against plaintiff on
this count as well as the title VII count. Id. at 756-57.
87. Id.
88. 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1316 (1980).
89. The "career ensemble" consisted of five basic color-coordinated items-a skirt, slacks,
jacket, tunic, or vest. A picture of the clothing is included in Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1029 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1316 (1980).
90. 604 F.2d at 1030. These days were called "glamour days." On these days, female employees were required merely to wear proper business attire.
91. See Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 448 F. Supp. 79, 80 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
From approximately 1958 to 1969, male employees were required to wear a suit supplied by de-
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From the time she was hired until May 1979, Carroll conformed to
the bank's dress code. On May 11, 14, and 18, 1979, however, she appeared at work dressed in "appropriate business attire," not in the uniform. Subsequently, the bank suspended her indefinitely without pay
until she resumed wearing the career ensemble.
As a result of her suspension, Carroll filed a class action suit under
title VII seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief on behalf
of all female employees of the bank. 9 2 Specifically, she claimed that
the bank's policy of imposing a dress code upon its female employees
without imposing a comparable dress code upon similarly-situated
male employees constituted sex discrimination in violation of section
703(a)(1) of title VII. 93 The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the case upon defendant's motion for
summary judgment on the ground that the dress requirements did not
prevent or hinder employment opportunities for women. 94 Carroll
then appealed to United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
The Majority Opinion
The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court, holding that
Talman's dress code discriminated against its female employees with
respect to compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of employment and therefore violated section 703(a)(1) of title VII. 95 Although
the facts in Carrollpresented a case of first impression, 96 the Seventh
Circuit easily found it to be a classic case of sex discrimination.
In considering the first step of its analysis-whether sex discrimination in fact occurred 97 -- the majority asserted that the district court
erred in deciding the case under section 702(a)(2) which focuses only
on a deprivation of employment opportunities.9 8 Rather, the Seventh
fendant. The program was discontinued at the request of the male tellers. The dress code in effect

when Carroll was hired required that men wears suits, business-type sport jackets and pants, or
leisure suits if worn with a tie. Id.

92. In October 1973, Carroll filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC claiming that
the dress code policy constituted unlawful sex discrimination. Brief for Appellant at 8-9, Carroll
v. Talman Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979). After finding reasonable cause
to believe that the bank's dress code policy violated title VII and failing to resolve the complaint

by conciliation, the EEOC issued a "right to sue" letter in February 1976. Appendix of Brief for
Appellant at 18-19.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).

94. 448 F. Supp. at 83.
95. 604 F.2d at 1033. See note 10 supra.

96. See 448 F. Supp. at 8 1.
97. See text accompanying notes 21-36 supra.
98. 604 F.2d at 1029. See note 3 supra.
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Circuit insisted that the question of whether a primafacie case of sex
discrimination occurred based upon the facts in Carroll should be decided under section 703(a)(1) which prohibits any inequities in compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of employment arising out
of a sex-based classification. 99
Specifically, the majority first found that Talman's dress regulations amounted to disparate compensation based upon sex. Because
the bank treated the uniforms as income and therefore withheld tax,
and because the female employees were required to clean and maintain
their uniforms, female employees were deprived of income which male
employees were not. '00 Second, the court also held that the dress code
discriminated against women in terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment. Addressing the fact that the women were compelled to
wear the uniform as a condition of employment, the court maintained
that such disparate treatment was demeaning to women because of "a
natural tendency to assume that the uniformed women have a lesser
professional status than their male colleagues attired in normal business clothes."' 0 ' Accordingly, the majority concluded that the uniform
requirement was the result of the exact type of sexual stereotyping the
Seventh Circuit had held to be unlawful in Sprogis v. UnitedAir Lines,
Inc. 102
After determining that Talman's dress code constituted a primafacie case of sex discrimination under section 703(a)(1), the majority
shifted its focus to the second step of the two-part analysis-whether
Talman satisfied its burden of proving a legal justification via a
BFOQ10 3 or a business necessity defense. 0 4 Talman asserted neither a
BFOQ nor a business necessity defense. 0 5 Instead, the bank argued
that the dress code, if discriminatory, was job-related or reasonably
necessary to the operation of its business.10 6 The court discarded
Talman's defenses as insufficient to sustain a valid business necessity
defense because other acceptable alternatives were available to accomplish the same business purpose.'0 7 The majority thus concluded that
99. Id.
100. 604 F.2d at 1030.
101. Id. at 1033.
102. See text accompanying notes 29-32 supra.
103. See text accompanying notes 40-55 supra.
104. See text accompanying notes 56-63 supra.
105. 604 F.2d at 1031.
106. Id.
107. Id. The majority suggested three alternatives to the bank's then current dress code. First,
the bank could require women to wear "appropriate business attire" as in the case of the male
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Talman failed to prove any legal justification for its discriminatory
08
practice.'
Finally, the majority dismissed the so-called "hair cases" and their
references to standards of dress as inapposite to the issue presented in
Carroll. In the hair cases such as Fagan v. National Cash Register
Co. 109 and in the tie case, Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,I ° the Carroll majority viewed the issue as one of whether an employer may promulgate different dress requirements for men and women which
conform to the traditional differences in the types of clothing worn by
men and women."l ' However, the Seventh Circuit viewed the issue in
Carrollas not whether an employer can lawfully promulgate grooming
standards that merely reflect social norms of proper business attire, but
whether an employer can lawfully promulgate regulations requiring all
women to wear a uniform but only requiring similarly-situated men to
wear "proper business attire." ' 12 Without passing judgment on the validity of prior cases involving grooming standards as sex discrimination, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Talman's dress code was
unlawful sex discrimination.
The Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Pell strongly disagreed with the
majority's reasoning and maintained that Talman's dress code policy
was not unlawful under title VII. To support his conclusion, Judge Pell
argued that the uniform requirement for female employees and the
"appropriate business attire" regulation for male employees were comparable, not disparate, terms and conditions in employment. 113 In a
lengthy commentary on men's and women's fashions, Judge Pell insisted that "customary business attire" for men has never really advanced beyond the status of being a uniform due to the lack of diversity
in men's clothing styles. 1 4 According to Judge Pell, the two rules were
employees; second, Talman could make the uniform optional; and third, the bank could also
require male employees to wear a uniform as they did between 1958 and 1969. Id.
108. Id.
109. 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See text accompanying notes 69-78 supra.
110. 555 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1977). See text accompanying notes 81-88 supra.
111. 604 F.2d at 1032. It would appear that the majority would find nothing wrong, for example, with a dress code requiring females to wear dresses and males to wear suits.
112. Id.
113. 604 F.2d at 1034 (Pell, J., dissenting).
114. Id. Judge Pell admitted however that variation in men's fashions exist:
There have been wide and narrow lapels, cuffed and cuffless trousers, different colored
shirts which are ordinarily substantially covered by jackets, some splashes of color in
neckties, a choice of four-in-hands or bowties, non-vested and vested suits, a choice of
belted or beltless or suspender-supported trousers, three button or two button jackets and
even occasionally in daring moments a pleated-back jacket . . . .Men, of course do
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only semantically different because both men and women were in effect
required to wear a "uniform," and therefore the rules did not offend
title VII. 115
Judge Pell alternatively argued that even if Talman's dress code
was viewed as imposing different requirements by sex, it was not the
kind of employment practice subject to title VII scrutiny. 116 Expressing
his concern over excessive government interference into the domain of
private enterprise, especially in matters he described as trivial such as
7
dress codes, Judge Pell relied upon the reasoning of the hair cases" 1 to
support his position. He would limit the scope of title VII to only those
regulations with a significant effect upon8 employment opportunities
where one sex is favored over the other."1
Judge Pell also discussed three aspects of the Carrollcase which he
felt should justify Talman's dress policy. Specifically, he argued that
the uniform requirement for women was not discriminatory because (1)
it did not substantially burden female employees more than male employees; i t9 (2) the uniforms were attractive and in no way could cause
embarrassment or be demeaning; 20 and (3) most of the female employees favored the policy.' 2 1 Therefore, unlike the majority, Judge Pell
have a choice of materials and colors in their suit, or sport jacket and slacks outfits, but I
am not aware that lurid colors would qualify as "customary business attire," any more
than would one of the bizarre assemblages worn by a modem rock singer.
Id. (footnote omitted).
115. Id. at 1034.
116. Id. at 1035-37.
117. See text accompanying notes 65-79 supra.
118. 604 F.2d at 1036 (Pell, J., dissenting). But see In re Consol. Pretrial Proceedings in the
Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142, 1146-47 (7th Cir. 1978), where Judge Pell, writing for the court,
struck down the validity of TWA's no-motherhood policy requiring female cabin attendants who
become mothers to resign or accept ground duty positions while not imposing similar restrictions
upon their male counterparts who become fathers. Judge Pell reasoned that "such assumptions
steeped in cultural stereotypes were anathema to the maturing state of Title VII analysis." Id.at
1146.
119. 604 F.2d at 1037 (Pell, J., dissenting). Judge Pell reasoned that, as long as the sex-differentiated regulations did not substantially burden female employees' enjoyment of their jobs more
than male employees, they were not subject to title VII scrutiny. The majority rebutted this argu-.
ment on the ground that a "substantial burden" test was not a criterion imposed by title VIL. Id.
at 1030.
120. Id. at 1037 (Pell, J., dissenting). In refuting this contention, the majority maintained that
personal tastes of the courts were irrelevant in determining whether an employment practice constituted unlawful sex discrimination. Id. at 1030.
121. Id. at 1038 (Pell, J., dissenting). To rebut this argument, the majority cited Los Angeles
Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978), which concluded:
[Title VII's] focus on the individual is unambiguous. It precludes treatment of individuals as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class. If height is
required for a job, a tall woman may not be refused employment merely because, on the
average, women are too short. Even a true generalization about the class is an insufficient reason for disqualifying an individual to whom the generalization does not apply.
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concluded that Talman's dress code was an improper subject for consideration under title VII.
ANALYSIS

The Majority Opinion. A Correct Approach
In Carroll v. Talman Federal Savings & Loan Association,122 the
Seventh Circuit correctly ruled that Talman's disparate dress regulations presented a classic case of sex discrimination with respect to terms
and conditions of employment under section 703(a)(1). In so ruling,
the Seventh Circuit merely followed its own precedent; yet, at the same
time, the court broadened the scope of title VII by holding that a dress
code which imposes different requirements by sex is subject to title VII
scrutiny. However, because the Seventh Circuit's decision in Carroll
was expressly limited to its facts and because the majority refused to
pass judgment upon the validity of prior decisions upholding sex-differentiated grooming regulations as permissible employment practices,
whether the Seventh Circuit is willing to extend its reasoning in Carroll
to future challenges of gender-based grooming regulations remains an
open question.
A clear reading of the Carroll opinion shows that the majority
opinion strictly adhered to the principles laid down by the Supreme
Court in Phillipsv. MartinMarietta Corp. 123 and by the Seventh Circuit
itself in Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc. 124-- that any disparate treatment in terms and conditions upon the basis of sex or resulting from
25
sex stereotypes constitutes a primafacie case of sex discrimination.1
Moreover, in applying these principles to the situation in Carroll,the
Seventh Circuit correctly followed the established two-step analysis in
deciding claims of sex discrimination under title VII.126 The court first
determined that discrimination based upon sex in fact occurred under
section 703(a)(1) of title VII.127 Then, the court determined that
Talman failed to meet its burden of establishing a BFOQ or business
necessity defense that would justify the discriminatory uniform requirement. 28 In light of prior cases in other circuits involving genderbased grooming regulations, the Seventh Circuit took a novel, yet
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1316 (1980).
400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).
444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
See text accompanying notes 29-32 supra.
See text accompanying notes 23-32 supra.
See text accompanying notes 97-108 supra.
See text accompanying notes 37-63 supra.
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proper approach in Carroll, unlike the approach advocated by Judge
Pell in his dissent.
The Dissenting Opinion. A Result-OrientedApproach
In maintaining that Talman's dress code policy was not unlawful
under title VII, Judge Pell tailored his reasoning to fit the result he
desired, thus ignoring the proper title VII analysis. For example, Judge
Pell argued that Talman's uniform requirement for women and the
"appropriate business attire" regulation for men were only semantically different because both men and women were in effect required to
wear a "uniform." 129 The flaw in this argument is readily apparentthe difference between the uniform requirement and the "appropriate
business standard" is more than just a matter of semantics. Unlike the
male employees, who were free to wear a wide variety of clothing, the
females were compelled to wear clothing of identical cut, style, and
material. In effect, therefore, the disparate terms in the dress code were
a striking example of an employment practice resulting from well-established sex stereotypes. It appears that Talman felt that it could trust
its male employees to know what constituted "proper business attire,"' 30 whereas Talman had to assure itself that women would do so
by requiring a uniform.' 3' The rationale seems to be that, left to their
own judgment, women may not have the business sense to dress in appropriate attire.
In addition, the uniform requirement may act as a barrier for a
female employee who wishes to rise to higher levels of management
because it prevents her from asserting her individuality which would
enable her to stand out from any other female employee. 132 Therefore,
even under the more limited interpretation of sex discrimination as defined by Judge Pell and the "hair cases," Talman's dress code is unlawful because it has the potential effect of significantly hindering
133
employment opportunities for women in the bank.
Judge Pell also agreed with the reasoning of the "hair cases" that
129. See text accompanying notes 113-114 supra.
130. See Brief for Appellant at 39, Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028
(7th Cir. 1979).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. The plaintiff in Carroll did not raise this argument. Cf. La Von Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co.
Grain, 466 F.Supp. 1388 (W.D. Mo. 1979), where plaintiff, a female employee, was fired for wearing a pantsuit in the employer's executive offices in violation of the company's dress code. The
plaintiff in Lanigan specifically contended that the dress code significantly affected employment
opportunities because it perpetuated sexist, chauvinistic attitudes. The court rejected this argument and strictly followed the line of reasoning of the "hair cases." Id. at 1392.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

1267

sex discrimination should be limited to employer-promulgated regulations involving employment opportunities, immutable characteristics,
or fundamental rights. 134 These factors, however, are relevant only in a
constitutional interpretation of sex discrimination and therefore should
have no bearing on title VII cases.3- It appears that these distinctions
were carved out to justify the courts' conclusions that gender-based
grooming regulations are of insufficient import to warrant attack under
title VII. In so doing, Judge Pell and the earlier grooming cases afforded greater deference to the judgment of private business than to the
bare terms of title VII and the principles laid down by the Phillps and
Sprogis decisions.
Summary
In contrast to the dissent, it appears that the majority in Carrollis
more sensitive to the seemingly more trivial forms of discrimination
which are commonplace in the employment arena, but often go unnoticed due to established sexual stereotypes. Accordingly, the Seventh
Circuit has refused to allow a threshold of permissible sex discrimination to which title VII would be inapplicable. Instead, the court has
indicated that sex discrimination is to be defined and remedied as
broadly as any other form of discrimination under title VII.
The discrimination which Talman fostered through its disparate
dress code is best illustrated by analogizing to a situation in which
blacks are required to wear a "uniform" in order to assure that they
dress for work in proper business clothes. No such racially-based regulation could possibly withstand attack under title VII.1 36 Although the
courts have traditionally given greater protection to victims of race discrimination than sex discrimination, 37 the debates surrounding the
1972 amendments to title VII reveal that Congress was largely concerned with remedying all forms of sex discrimination in employment. 38 In sum, the Seventh Circuit properly reversed the decision of
the district court.
134. See text accompanying notes 73-77 supra.
135. See note 79 supra.
136. See Brief for Appellant at 2, Carroll v. Talman Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028
(7th Cir. 1979).
137. The United States Supreme Court has held that race, but not sex, is a "suspect classification" and therefore is entitled to greater protection under the fourteenth amendment. Compare
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (race) with Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973) (sex).
138. See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
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AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE

Although the Seventh Circuit in Carroll appears to have broadened the scope of title VII, it is difficult to glean from the opinion
whether the court is willing to extend the Carroll rationale to all cases
involving challenges to gender-based grooming regulations. Not only
did the majority limit its decision to the facts in Carroll,139 but the majority opinion stated that as long as a grooming regulation "finds some
justification in commonly accepted social norms and [is] reasonably related to the employer's needs, such regulations are not necessarily violations of title VII even though the standards differ somewhat for men
and women." 4 0 From this statement, it would appear that the Seventh
Circuit would uphold the validity of employer-promulgated rules requiring male employees to wear short hair or a tie as a condition of
employment since short hair for men is a commonly accepted social
norm and relates to the employer's need to project a favorable image
with customers and the public in general. However, such a conclusion
is difficult to reconcile with the Carroll rationale.
For example, suppose that the Seventh Circuit was presented with
the factual situation in Dodge v. Giant Food,Inc.' 4' in which the employer required its male employees to maintain short hair as a condition of employment while it permitted similarly-situated female
employees to wear their hair in any reasonable hairstyle, long or short.
If the Seventh Circuit were to apply the proper test for sex discrimination as it did in Carroll,the sex-differentiated hair regulation would be
held unlawful. Under Phillps v. Martin Marietta Corp.,142 the sexbased hair regulation singled out men with long hair for disfavored
treatment which they would not have received but for the fact they
were male.' 43 In addition, the regulation is unlawful under Sprogis v.
UnitedAir Lines, Inc. '44 because it is the result of stereotyping-shorthaired men are the commonly accepted norm; long-haired men conjure
up stereotypes of hippies, radical politics, troublemakers, and non-conformity in general. 145 Thus, the Seventh Circuit ought to find a prima
facie case of sex discrimination.
After finding a primafacie case, the Seventh Circuit would then
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
note 68

604 F.2d at 1031-32.
Id. at 1032.
488 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also text accompanying notes 70-77 supra.
400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).
See text and accompanying notes 24-29 supra.
444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
See Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661, 666 (D.C. Cal. 1972). See also
supra.
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address the issue of whether the employer satisfied its burden of justifying the disparate regulation as a valid business necessity. 46 Under the
strict standards of the business necessity test,' 47 the sex-based regulations could not stand as a valid business necessity because the hair regulation is not an overriding legitimate business purpose that is
necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business.' 48 Moreover, acceptable alternatives with an equal or less discriminatory impact 49 are available to the employer such as a regulation requiring all
employees with long hair to wear it in a neat, orderly fashion. In conclusion, the Seventh Circuit, in applying the Carroll rationale, ought to
find a sex-based hair regulation unlawful sex discrimination.
Nevertheless, the majority in Carrollclearly expressed its shared
reluctance with the other federal circuits to subject a short-hair or tie
regulation to the provisions of title VII.150 In Carroll,the Seventh Circuit seemed to imply that a regulation compelling women to wear a
uniform as a condition of employment does not involve commonly accepted social norms as does a regulation requiring men to wear short
hair as a condition of employment, and therefore the two situations are
readily distinguishable. Although admittedly the gender-based uniform requirement is a more offensive type of sex-based regulation than
the short-hair requirement, the hair regulation is no less the result of
sex stereotyping. Thus, the question becomes how the Seventh Circuit,
if faced with a "hair case," for example, will attempt to justify upholding it in light of its decision in Carroll. On an even broader level, the
question is where does a court begin to draw the line between those
grooming regulations worthy of title VII protection and those which
are not?
These questions could be avoided if the courts simply followed the
Seventh Circuit's approach in Carroll. If the challenged regulation
cannot withstand the two-part test for determining claims of sex discrimination, whether it be grooming regulations or hiring practices,
then it is unlawful. However, such a sweeping approach, to an extent,
ignores certain societal expectations. For example, even a grooming
regulation prescribing only that "all bank tellers wear proper business
attire to work" is ultimately based on sex-differentiated standards. Al146. The defense would not apply to this situation. See text accompanying notes 40-55 supra.
147. See Robinson v. Lorillard, 444 F.2d 791, 797-99 (4th Cir. 1971) for a well-articulated
explanation of the business necessity defense.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. 604 F.2d at 1032.
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though the rule on its face does not classify on the basis of sex, enforcement of it does: Males wearing long hair or females wearing slacks will
not be considered to be in "proper business attire." As a result, if the
Carrolltest were extended to its most extreme, yet logical, conclusion,
men should be permitted to wear dresses to work barring any business
necessity defense.
In response to such a potential conclusion, the Seventh Circuit in
dicta indicated that not all sexual stereotyping should be unlawful
under title VII by including a caveat: Grooming regulations which reflect the customary differences between men and women's dress should
not be considered unlawful. In this respect, the Carrollopinion, too, is
a result-oriented decision in which the Seventh Circuit drew an arbitrary line separating permissible from impermissible gender-based
grooming regulations.
CONCLUSION

In Carroll, the Seventh Circuit properly held that Talman's
gender-based dress code requiring female employees to wear
"uniforms" while requiring similarly-situated male employees to wear
"proper business attire" was unlawful under section 703(a)(1) of title
VII. On the most basic level, Carrollcan be viewed as a classic case of
sex discrimination in which the Seventh Circuit strictly adhered to the
principals established by the Supreme Court in Phillos v. Martin Marietta Corp. and by its own decision in Sprogis v. UnitedAir Lines, Inc.
In addition, the Seventh Circuit correctly applied the two-part test for
determining whether a particular employment regulation constitutes
sex discrimination.
Yet, at the same, the Seventh Circuit's holding appears to have
broadened the scope of title VII by departing with the other federal
courts of appeals and ruling that a dress code which imposes different
requirements by sex is subject to title VII scrutiny. In light of such a
firm conclusion, the majority in dicta, however, appears to soften the
potential impact of Carroll. Not only did the Seventh Circuit expressly
limit its decision to the Carrollfacts, but the majority also forewarned
that if a sex-based regulation finds some justification in commonly accepted social norms and is reasonably related to the employer's needs,
then it is likely that the Seventh Circuit would uphold such a regulation. In sum, the practical effect of the Seventh Circuit's opinion in
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Carrollsuggests that employers may lawfully promulgate comprehensive dress codes as long as the codes on their face do not classify by sex.
SUSAN HILLARY LOEB

INDEX
TO
VOLUME 56

